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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves a claim for damages suffered by the
appellant when her automobile was struck by a driver (Floyd) who
was fleeing from a Utah Highway Patrolman.

Suit was brought

against both the State of Utah and the municipalities of Salem
City and Spanish Fork City, and their employees.

The District

Court of Salt Lake County granted summary judgment in favor of
all defendants on the grounds, inter alia, that §63-30-7(2)
provided absolute immunity to the defendants from damages resulting from an accident caused by a fleeing driver.

Summary judg-

ment was also granted the municipal defendants, because there was
no showing that any act or omission of those defendants caused or
contributed to the high speed pursuit and the ultimate collision.
Plaintiff appealed and this Court affirmed (247 UAR 19) in
all respects, holding that §63-30-7(2), Utah Code Ann., was
constitutional and operated to bar plaintiff's claims against the
defendant law enforcement officers and their employers.

As to

the municipal defendants, the Court also affirmed on the basis
that "our review of the record reveals an insufficiency of
alleged facts to establish causation on the part of the cities or
their employees, as a matter of law," 247 UAR at 20.
Appellant filed a Petition for Rehearing, arguing that
§63-30-7(2) violated various constitutional rights of the plaintiff, that the governmental entities were not immune from suit
under the discretionary function exception of §63-30-10, and that
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a determination of lack of causation cannot be decided as a
matter of law.
As to the last point, the appellant fails to "state with
particularity the points of law or fact which the petitioner
claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ", as
required by Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
simply reargues the same points made in her original briefs.
The municipal defendants were entitled to summary judgment
based upon the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and wellestablished principles of common law.

In addition, and more

fundamentally, the municipal defendants were entitled to summary
judgment because the appellant simply failed to develop any
evidence that any act or omission of those defendants caused the
"high speed chase" and/or the collision between the fleeing
driver and the plaintiff.

Thus, regardless of whether the Court

decides to grant the appellant's Petition for Rehearing, same
should be granted only on the constitutional issues which relate
peculiarly to the State defendants and the Petition should be
denied as to the municipal defendants.
Accordingly, the municipal appellees incorporate by reference and adopt the arguments set forth in the State's Response to
the Petition for Rehearing as they relate to Points I, II, III
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and IV of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.1

The municipal

appellees will thus respond only to the causation argument set
forth in Point V of Appellant's Petition.
LACK OF CAUSATION WAS PROPERLY DETERMINED
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Petitioner's fundamental complaint is that it was inappropriate for the Court to conclude that the municipal defendants
could not be liable because Floyd "simply went around the municipal officer's vehicles, did not see them again after passing
them prior to the collision, and was attempting at all times
during the pursuit to elude only Trooper Colyar" (247 UAR 20),
and complains (without citation of authority) that same was
improper under Utah law.
It must be kept in mind that the plaintiff does not claim
that the police officers themselves ran into her vehicle.

Her

fundamental complaint is that a high speed chase was initiated
and continued under circumstances where it was unreasonable to do
so and it was foreseeable that Floyd would, while fleeing from
the police, drive in an even more reckless fashion and collide
with some innocent third party.

The negligence on the part of

the police officer would, obviously, have to consist of some
1

These appellees would, however, venture the observation that
none of the cases cited by appellant stand for the proposition
that, at common law, an officer could be liable for the reckless
acts of a fleeing miscreant. Our forefathers, unaccustomed to the
recent trend of expanding tort liability, would likely have been
astonished by the notion that the policeman should pay for injuries
caused by the lawbreaker.
-3-

overt affirmative act, such as turning on his lights and sirens
and chasing the fleeing driver, all of which thus presumably
motivates him to drive yet faster and more recklessly.

One could

hardly make such a claim against a police officer whose police
car was only observed parked by the side of the road, even if the
mere presence of that police officer made the fleeing suspect
nervous, for in that instance there would be nothing that the
officer could do to avoid liability other than to suddenly make
himself and his police car invisible.

Surely, neither the law,

public policy, nor common sense would impose even the potential
of liability on the officer for merely being in the neighborhood
when the fleeing driver drove by.

Yet, that is essentially what

the Petitioner argues as against these defendants.
There is no dispute that the only thing that Floyd knew
about Officers Brad James and Ed Asay was that he drove past
their police cars, leaving them behind and never to be seen by
him again.

Granted, the officers made their presence known by

activating their overhead lights, but Floyd did not know that
they did anything more than that.

Floyd was fleeing no one other

than the highway patrolman, although at the end of the chase he
was also being pursued by a Utah County Sheriff's vehicle.2

2

0ddly, plaintiff has not seen fit to sue the County, even
though its involvement was much more direct than that of the
municipalities.
-4-

Petitioner's attempt to impose liability on the municipal
officers is both nonsensical and contrary to Petitioner's fundamental theory in this case; that is, that to chase someone and
cause them to flee under some circumstances may impose liability
because the danger of the fleeing driver colliding with a third
person is foreseeable.

Floyd knew that the highway patrolman was

pursuing him, and he was fleeing accordingly.

He did not know

that the municipal officers were pursuing him, he was not trying
to evade them, and nothing that the municipal officers did, or
didn't do, influenced his conduct in any way whatsoever.

Indeed,

petitioner's attempt to hold those officers liable smacks of
overreaching.
The only authorities cited by Petitioner are cases from
Florida, Maryland and Michigan, each of which is factually
distinguishable, and legally irrelevant.
Brown v. City of Pinellas Park, 557 So.2d 161 (Fla. App. 2
Dist. 1990), involved a number of officers in active pursuit
(described as a "speeding caravan"), where it would be impossible
to draw any distinctions as to how the fleeing driver was reacting to any particular pursuing police vehicle.
The Maryland case, Boyer v. State, 594 A.2d 121 (1991),
involved a high speed chase initiated by a highway patrolman
joined by a number of sheriff's deputies.

There was no discus-

sion of the exact involvement of the deputies.

The Court held

only that, as a legal matter, the State and County officers might
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be held liable if indeed negligence was established on remand; it
does not stand for the proposition that causation may not be
determined as a matter of law on undisputed facts.
Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 339 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. 1983),
held that the involved officers might be liable if after remand
it were determined that their pursuit of the fleeing driver was
negligent.

In that case, the officers in the first police car

observed the suspect commit a traffic violation and thereupon
initiated and continued a lengthy high speed pursuit.

The flee-

ing driver lost control of his car and it came to a stop.

While

one of the first officers was approaching his car, he sped off.
A few moments later he was observed and chased by another police
officer who had heard of the first chase over the radio.

While

the second chase was under way, the accident occurred involving
the plaintiff.

In the instant case, of course, Officers James

and Asay neither initiated the initial pursuit, nor was the fleeing driver attempting to elude them at the time of the accident.
Fiser thus does not support Petitioner's argument.3
It is abundantly clear from the uncontradicted testimony of
Floyd himself that his conduct was in no way influenced by the
mere presence of the police cars driven by Officers James and

3

Indeed, Fiser held that an officer who did not personally
operate either of the vehicles involved in the high speed chase
could not be held liable as a matter of law.
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Asay.4

Since the fundamental operative facts of this case are

undisputed, it is clearly appropriate for the Court to enter
summary judgment in favor of a party whose acts have not been
shown to be the cause of the harm complained of.
tal proposition is well recognized in Utah.

This fundamen-

Apache Tank Lines,

Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985); Jensen v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel Company, 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); see also
White v. Deseelhorst, 245 UAR 4 (S.C. 8/16/94) (recognizing that
summary judgment may be appropriate on the issue of causation if
facts are undisputed).
contrary.

Plaintiff cites no authority to the

In absence of causation, both factual and legally

(proximately), there can be no negligence action, Williams v.
Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
CONCLUSION
The facts of the case are undisputed and the law is settled.
This Court did not overlook or misapprehend any significant
factual or legal issue, the Court's opinion is correct in all
respects, and the appellant's Petition for Rehearing should be
denied.

Reference should be made to these defendants' main brief at
pages 2-7, setting forth verbatim the relevant portions of Floyd's
testimony.
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